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Abstract
In this paper we study the N-player nonzero-sumDynkin game (N ≥ 3) in continuous
time, which is a non-cooperative game where the strategies are stopping times. We show
that the game has a Nash equilibrium point for general payoff processes.
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1 Introduction
A Dynkin game is a game where the controllers make use of stopping times as control
actions. Actually assume one has N players denoted by π1, ..., πN and each of which is
allowed, according to its advantages, to stop the evolution of a system. The system can be
for example an option contract which binds several agents (players) in a financial market.
So for i = 1, ..., N , assume that the player πi makes the decision to stop the system at τi,
then its corresponding yield is given by:
Ji(τ1, · · · , τN ) := E[X
i
τi
1{τi<Ri} +Q
i
τi
1{τi=Ri} + Y
i
Ri
1{τi>Ri}] (1.1)
where Ri := min{τj , j 6= i} and X
i, Qi, Y i are stochastic processes described precisely
below. This yield depends actually on whether πi is the first to stop the evolution of the
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system or not. So the main problem we are interested in is to find a Nash equilibrium point
(hereafter NEP for short) for the game, i.e., an N -uplet of stopping times (τ∗1 , ..., τ
∗
N ) such
that for any i = 1, ..., N , for any τi,
Ji(τ
∗
1 , · · · , τ
∗
N ) ≥ Ji(τ
∗
1 , ..., τ
∗
i−1, τi, τ
∗
i+1, ..., τ
∗
N ).
A NEP is a collective strategy of stopping for the players which has the feature that if
one of them decides unilaterally to change a strategy of stopping then it is penalized.
In the case when N = 2 and J1 + J2 = 0, the game is called of zero-sum type and
the corresponding NEP is called a saddle-point for the game. Otherwise it is called of
nonzero-sum type.
The first works related to Dynkin games, which concern mainly the zero-sum setting,
go back to several decades before (see e.g. [2, 3, 8, 11, 16, 17, 20, 25, 21, 27], etc. and the
references given there). This latter setting was revisited several years later by many authors
especially in connection with reflected backward equations [6], the pricing of American game
contingent claims introduced by Y. Kifer (see e.g. [15, 12, 14, 18], etc.), convertible bonds
(see e.g. [5, 24]) or other reasons ([19, 26]), etc.
In comparison, nonzero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time, introduced by Bensous-
san and Friedman in [1] have attracted few research activities (see e.g. [1, 4, 10, 13, 23],
etc.). Moreover, on the one hand, those papers deal with the case of two players (even in
[1]) and, on the other hand, the assumptions on the data of the problem are rather tough
since, except a recent paper by S.Hamade`ne and J.Zhang [13], authors assume that e.g. the
processes Y i of (1.1) are supermartingales. Even in the discrete time setting, this latter
assumption is supposed (e.g. in [22]).
So the main objective of this paper is to study the continuous time nonzero-sum Dynkin
game in the case when there are more than two players and general stochastic processes Xi,
Y i and Qi, i = 1, ..., N . The processes Y i are no longer supposed being supermartingales.
We actually show this game has a Nash equilibrium point under minimal assumptions. We
should point out that according to our best knowledge this problem has been not considered
yet and the generalization from the two-player setting to the multi-player one, even with
respect to the work by Hamade`ne-Zhang [13], is not formal and raises questions which are
far from to be obvious, especially the construction of the approximating scheme and the
study of its properties.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set accurately the problem, recall
the Snell envelope notion and provide a result (Prop. 2.1) which is in a way the streamline
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in the construction of the of the NEP of the nonzero-sum Dynkin game. The approximating
scheme and its main properties are introduced in Section 3. Finally in Section 4, we show
that the limit of the approximating scheme is a NEP for the game.
2 Setting of the problem and hypotheses
Throughout this paper T is a positive real constant which stands for the horizon of the
problem and (Ω,F ,P) is a fixed probability space on which is defined a filtration F :=
(Ft)t≤T which satisfies the usual conditions, i.e., it is complete and right continuous.
Next for any stopping time θ ≤ T , let us denote by:
(i) Tθ the set of F-stopping times τ such that P-a.s. τ ∈ [θ, T ];
(ii) Eθ[.] the conditional expectation w.r.t. Fθ, i.e., Eθ[X] := E[X|Fθ], for any integrable
random variable X ;
(iii) J := {1, ..., N}.
Next an F-progressively measurable IR-valued stochastic process (ζt)t≤T is called of class
[D] if the set of random variables {ζτ , τ ∈ T0} is uniformly integrable. Now for i = 1, ..., N ,
let us introduce F-progressively measurable and IR-valued stochastic processes of class [D],
Xi := (Xit)t≤T , Q
i := (Qit)t≤T and Y
i := (Y it )t≤T , which moreover satisfy the following
hypotheses:
Assumption 2.1 : For any i = 1, . . . , N ,
(A1): Xi is right continuous with left limits (RCLL for short) and does not have negative
predictable jumps ;
(A2): The process Y i is right continuous, i.e., P-a.s., for any t < T , Y it = limsցt Y
i
s and
of class [D]. As a consequence if (γn)n≥0 is a decreasing sequence of F-stopping times then
E[Y ilimn γn ] = limnE[Y
i
γn ] ;
(A3): The processes Xi, Y i and Qi verify:
P − a.s. ∀t ≤ T,Xit ≤ Q
i
t ≤ Y
i
t ;
(A4): For all τ ∈ T0, P-a.s.
(Qiτ < Y
i
τ ; τ < T ) ⊆
N⋂
j=1
(Xjτ < Y
j
τ ).
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Note that assumptions (A1)-(A3) are minimal in order to solve the problem, as for [A4],
it is satisfied for e.g. for any i ∈ J and τ ∈ T0, P-a.s. on (τ < T ): X
i
τ < Y
i
τ or Q
i
τ = Y
i
τ .
Next for T1, T2, · · · , TN elements of T0 and for i ∈ J , let us define Ji(T1, T2, · · · , TN ),
the payoff associated with the player i, as follows:
Ji(T1, T2, · · · , TN ) := E
{
XiTi1{Ti<Ri} +Q
i
Ti
1{Ti=Ri} + Y
i
Ri
1{Ti>Ri}
}
. (2.1)
where Ri := min{Tj , j 6= i} = ∧j=1,N ;j 6=iTj .
The meaning of those payoffs in this nonzero-sum Dynkin game framework is the following:
Assume that for any i = 1, ..., N , the player πi makes the decision to use the stopping time
Ti as a strategy of stopping. Let i0 ∈ J , then:
- πi0 will receive an amount equal to X
i0
Ti0
if it decides unilaterally to stop controlling
first. As for the other players πj, j 6= i0, each one will receive an amount which equals to
Y jTi0
;
- πi0 will receive an amount equal to Q
i0
Ti0
if there is a commitment with one or more
other players to stop first the game. Each one of the players j which do not get involved in
the commitment will receive Y jTi0
.
We next precise the notion of equilibrium that we are looking for.
Definition 2.2 We say that (T ∗1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
N ) ∈ T0
N is a Nash equilibrium point of the
Nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with (Ji)i∈J if for all i = 1, · · · , N and all T1, · · · , TN ∈
T0 we have:
Ji(T
∗
1 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, Ti, T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) ≤ Ji(T
∗
1 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ). (2.2)
The definition means that when the equilibrium is reached, is penalized each one of the
players which makes the decision to change unilaterally its strategy of stopping. ✷
Next to begin with we give a result which in way is a streamline in order to construct
a NEP for the nonzero-sum Dynkin game. Actually we have:
Proposition 2.1 Assume there exist N stopping times (τ∗i )i=1,N and N F-progressively
measurable RCLL processes (W i)i=1,N , such that for any i = 1, ..., N , if we set Ri =
τ∗1 ∧ ... ∧ τ
∗
i−1 ∧ τ
∗
i+1 ∧ ... ∧ τ
∗
N and R = τ
∗
1∧... ∧ τ
∗
N = τ
∗
i ∧Ri then:
(i) (W it∧R)t≤T is an F-martingale and (W
i
t∧Ri
)t≤T is an F-supermatingale,
4
(ii) ∀ t ≤ T , W it 1 {t<Ri} ≥ X
i
t1 {t<Ri] and W
i
τ∗
i
1 {τ∗
i
<Ri} = X
i
τ∗
i
1 {τ∗
i
<Ri},
(iii) W iRi = Y
i
Ri
1 {Ri<T} +Q
i
T 1 {Ri=T} and (Y
i
Ri
−QiRi)1 {Ri=τ∗i <T} = 0.
Then the N -uplet of stopping times (τ∗i )i=1,N is a Nash equilibrium point for the nonzero-
sum Dynkin game associated with (Ji)i∈J . Moreover for any i ∈ J ,
Ji((τ
∗
i )i=1,N ) = E[W
i
0].
Proof: Actually for any i ∈ J , since (W it∧R)t≤T is a martingale then
E[W i0] = E[W
i
R]
= E[W iτ∗
i
1 {τ∗
i
<Ri} +W
i
Ri
1 {τ∗
i
=Ri} +W
i
Ri
1 {τ∗
i
>Ri}].
(2.3)
But taking into account the equalities of (iii) we get:
W iRi1 {τ∗i =Ri} +W
i
Ri
1 {τ∗
i
>Ri}
= (Y iRi1 {Ri<T} +Q
i
T 1 {Ri=T})1 {τ∗i =Ri} + (Y
i
Ri
1 {Ri<T} +Q
i
T 1 {Ri=T})1 {τ∗i >Ri}
= QiRi1 {Ri=τ∗i <T} +Q
i
T 1 {Ri=τ∗i =T} + Y
i
Ri
1 {Ri<τ∗i }
= QiRi1 {Ri=τ∗i } + Y
i
Ri
1 {Ri<τ∗i }
Making now the substitution in (2.3) we deduce that:
E[W i0] = E[X
i
τ∗
i
1 {τ∗
i
<Ri} +Q
i
τ∗
i
1 {τ∗
i
=Ri} + Y
i
Ri
1 {τ∗
i
>Ri}]
= Ji(τ
∗
1 , ..., τ
∗
N ).
On the other hand since (W it∧Ri)t≤T is an F-supermatingale then for any stopping time
γ ∈ T0 we have,
E[W i0] ≥ E[W
i
γ∧Ri
]
= E[W iγ1 {γ<Ri} +W
i
Ri
1 {γ=Ri} +W
i
Ri
1 {γ>Ri}].
(2.4)
But once more
W iRi1 {γ=Ri} +W
i
Ri
1 {γ>Ri}
= (Y iRi1 {Ri<T} +Q
i
T1 {Ri=T})1 {γ=Ri} + (Y
i
Ri
1 {Ri<T} +Q
i
T 1 {Ri=T})1 {γ>Ri}
= (Y iRi1 {Ri<T} +Q
i
T1 {Ri=T})1 {γ=Ri} + Y
i
Ri
1 {γ>Ri}
≥ QiRi1 {γ=Ri} + Y
i
Ri
1 {γ>Ri}
since Y i ≥ Qi. Plugging now this last term in (2.4) and since W iγ1 {γ<Ri} ≥ X
i
γ1 {γ<Ri} we
obtain:
Ji(τ
∗
1 , ..., τ
∗
N ) = E[W
i
0]
≥ E[Xiγ1 {γ<Ri} +Q
i
Ri
1 {γ=Ri} + Y
i
Ri
1 {γ>Ri}] = Ji(τ
∗
1 , ..., τ
∗
i−1, γ, τ
∗
i+1, ..., τ
∗
N ).
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Thus the N -uplet of stopping times (τ∗i )i=1,N is a Nash equilibrium for the nonzero-sum
Dynkin game.
To tackle the game problem, we mainly use the notion of Snell envelope of processes
which we introduce briefly now. For more details on this subject one can refer e.g. to
El-Karoui [9] or Dellacherie and Meyer [7].
Theorem 1 ([7], pp. 431 or [9], pp. 140) : Let U = (Ut)0≤t≤T be an F-adapted IR-valued
RCLL process that belongs to class [D]. Then there exists Z := (Zt)0≤t≤T an F-adapted
IR-valued RCLL process of class [D], such that Z is the smallest super-martingale which
dominates U , i.e, if (Z¯t)0≤t≤T is another RCLL supermartingale of class [D] such that
Z¯ ≥ U then Z¯ ≥ Z, P-a.s.. The process Z is called the Snell envelope of U . It satisfies the
following properties:
(i) For any F-stopping time θ we have:
Zθ = esssup
τ∈Tθ
E[Uτ |Fθ] (and then ZT = UT ). (2.5)
(ii) If the predictable jumps of U are only positive, then the stopping time
τ∗ = inf{s ≥ 0, Zs = Us}
is optimal, i.e.,
E[Z0] = E[Zτ∗ ] = E[Uτ∗ ] = sup
τ≥0
E[Uτ ]. (2.6)
Remark 2.3 As a by-product of (2.6) we have Zτ∗ = Uτ∗ and the process (Zt∧τ∗)t≤T is a
martingale.
3 The approximating scheme and its properties
We are now going to introduce sequences of stopping times which, as we will show it later,
converge to a NEP of the game. So let us consider the sequence of F-stopping times (τn)n≥1
defined, by induction, as follows:
(i) τ1 = · · · τN = T.
(ii) For n ≥ N +1, let (i, q) = (in, qn) ∈ IN
2 be such that n = Nq+ i with 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Then
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let us set:
− θn = min{τn−1, τn−2, · · · , τn−N+1} ;
− Unt = X
i
t1{t<θn} + Y˜
i
θn
1{t≥θn} with Y˜
i
t = Q
i
T 1{t=T} + Y
i
t 1{t<T}, ∀t ≤ T ;
− ∀t ≤ T, W nt = esssupν∈Tt E[U
n
ν |Ft] ;
− µn = inf{s ≥ 0,W
n
s = U
n
s } ;
− τn = (µn ∧ τn−N )1{µn∧τn−N<θn} + τn−N1{µn∧τn−N≥θn}.
Remark 3.1 As a direct consequence of the above definitions and the properties of the Snell
envelope, the following relations or properties hold true: for any n ≥ N + 1,
(i) W n is RCLL and for any t ≥ θn,
W nt = U
n
t = Y˜
i
θn ;
(ii)
µn ≤ θn, τn ≤ τn−N and θn ≤ θn−N ;
(iii) since the predictable jumps of Un are only positive and taking into account Assumption
(A3), we deduce from Theorem 1-(ii) that µn is optimal, i.e.,
E[W n0 ] = E[W
n
µn ] = E[U
n
µn ] = sup
τ≥0
E[Unτ ].
(iv) Let n = Nq + i where the pair (i, q) is as above, therefore even if this is not explicitly
mentioned in the definition, the stopping time θn = θNq+i depends on i. The same happens
for Un, τn, µn and W
n. ✷
Additionally we have:
Proposition 3.1 For any n ≥ 1, µn+N ≤ τn, P-a.s..
Proof: Actually suppose there exists m ≥ 1 such that P [τm < µm+N ] > 0 and let us set
n = min{m ≥ 1 s.t. P [τm < µm+N ] > 0}. Then we obviously have n ≥ N + 1. Next on the
set {τn < µn+N} we have:
τn < θn+N := τn+N−1 ∧ τn+N−2 ∧ · · · τn+1 (3.1)
since µn+N ≤ θn+N (Rem.3.1-(ii)). But the definition of n implies that µn+N−1 ≤ τn−1 and
then
τn+N−1 = µn+N−11{µn+N−1<θn+N−1} + τn−11{µn+N−1=θn+N−1}
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and from (3.1) and the definition of θn+N−1 we deduce that θn+N−1 = τn. It follows that:
τn+N−1 = µn+N−11{µn+N−1<τn} + τn−11{µn+N−1=τn}
Therefore
τn < τn+N−1 = τn−1. (3.2)
The strict inequality stems from (3.1) as for the equality it holds true since µn+N−1 ≤
θn+N−1 = τn and τn < τn+N−1.
Next
θn+N−2 := τn+N−3 ∧ τn+N−4 ∧ · · · τn+1 ∧ τn ∧ τn−1 = τn
since from (3.1) for any k = 1, ..., N − 1 we have τn < τn+k and from (3.2) τn < τn−1. But
once more the definitions of n and τn+N−2 imply that:
τn+N−2 = µn+N−21{µn+N−2<τn} + τn−21{µn+N−2=τn}
As we know that τn+N−2 > τn then τn+N−2 = τn−2 > τn.
Repeating now this procedure as many times as necessary we deduce that for any j =
1, . . . , N − 1,
τn < τn+N−j = τn−j
and then on the set {τn < µn+N} we have
τn < θn+N = θn
and thanks to the definitions of n and τn we also have on Γ := {τn < µn+N}
τn = µn1{µn<θn} + τn−N1{µn=θn} = µn
since µn ≤ τn−N . Therefore on the set Γ ∈ Fτn we have U
n = Un+N since θn+N = θn and
1 ΓW
n+N
µn
= 1 ΓW
n+N
τn
= 1 Γ esssupν∈Tτn E[U
n+N
ν |Fτn ] = esssupν∈Tτn E[1 ΓU
n+N
ν |Fτn ]
= esssupν∈Tτn E[1 ΓU
n
ν |Fτn ]
= 1 ΓW
n
τn = 1 ΓW
n
µn
= 1 ΓU
n
µn
= 1 ΓU
n+N
µn
,
i.e., 1 ΓW
n+N
µn = 1 ΓU
n+N
µn and then µn+N ≤ µn on Γ since µn+N is the first time that
W n+N reaches Un+N . As on Γ we have µn = τn < µn+N then this is contradictory with
the previous inequality. It follows that P [Γ] = 0 and for any m ≥ 1 we have µm+N ≤ τm,
P-a.s.. The proof is complete.
As a by-product we obtain:
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Corollary 3.2 For any n ≥ N + 1,
(i) τn = µn1{µn<θn} + τn−N1{µn=θn} ;
(ii) µn = τn ∧ θn = τn ∧ τn−1 ∧ · · · τn−N+1.
Proof: Indeed, (i) is a direct consequence of the previous proposition and the definition of
τn. As for (ii), we have
τn ∧ θn = τn1 {τn<θn} + θn1 {τn≥θn}.
But τn1 {τn<θn} = µn1 {µn<θn} and on [τn ≥ θn] we have θn = µn. Therefore θn1 {τn≥θn} =
µn1 {τn≥θn}. Gathering now those relations yields µn = τn ∧ θn. Finally the second equality
is just the definition of θn.
4 Existence of a Nash equilibrium point
For any i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, let us define:
T ∗i = limn−→∞
τNn+i and R
∗
i = limn−→∞
θNn+i = min{T
∗
j ; j 6= i}.
Those limits exist since for any n ≥ N+1, we know that τn ≤ τn−N therefore the sequences
(τNn+i)n≥0 are non-increasing for fixed i.
We have also, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
R∗ := T ∗1 ∧ · · · ∧ T
∗
N = limn−→∞
µNn+i = lim
n−→∞
µn.✷
We are going now to show that the N -uplet of stopping times (T ∗i )i=1,...,N is a Nash
equilibrium point for the N-players nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with (Ji)i∈J .
The proof will be obtained after several intermediary results given below.
Lemma 4.1 For any n ≥ 1, i ∈ {1, · · · , N} and any θ ∈ T0 we have:
Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, θ, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N )
≤ Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, τNn+N+i, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N )
+E[(Y iτNn+N+i −Q
i
τNn+N+i
) 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i<T}].
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Proof: For any n ≥ 1, i ∈ {1, · · · , N} and θ ∈ T0,
Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, θ, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N )
= E
{
Xiθ1 {θ<θNn+N+i} +Q
i
θ1 {θ=θNn+N+i} + Y
i
θNn+N+i
1 {θ>θNn+N+i}
}
.
But
Xiθ1 {θ<θNn+N+i} ≤W
Nn+N+i
θ 1 {θ<θNn+N+i}
and since Qi ≤ Y i we have
Qiθ1 {θ=θNn+N+i} + Y
i
θNn+N+i
1 {θ>θNn+N+i}
≤ (QiT 1 {θNn+N+i=T} + Y
i
θNn+N+i
1 {T>θNn+N+i})1 {θ≥θNn+N+i}
≤WNn+N+iθNn+N+i 1 {θ≥θNn+N+i}.
Therefore
Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, θ, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N )
≤ E[WNn+N+iθ∧θNn+N+i ] ≤ E[W
Nn+N+i
0 ]
(4.3)
since WNn+N+i is a supermartingale.
Next
Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, τNn+N+i, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N )
= E[UNn+N+iτNn+N+i∧θNn+N+i ] +E[(Q
i
θNn+N+i
− Y iθNn+N+i) 1 (τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i<T )]
= E[UNn+N+iµNn+i+1 ] +E[(Q
i
θNn+N+i
− Y iθNn+N+i) 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i<T}]
= E[WNn+N+iµNn+i+1 ] +E[(Q
i
θNn+N+i
− Y iθNn+N+i) 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i<T}]
= E[WNn+N+i0 ] +E[(Q
i
θNn+N+i
− Y iθNn+N+i) 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i<T}]
(4.4)
since τNn+N+i ∧ θNn+N+i = µNn+i+1 (Cor. 4.1-(ii)), (W
Nn+N+i
t∧µNn+i+1
)t≤T is a martingale (Re-
mark 2.3) and finally by (i) of Remark 3.1. Comparing now (4.3) and (4.4) to obtain the
desired result.
We now focus on the limits of the terms that appear in the inequality of the previous
lemma.
Lemma 4.2 : The following asymptotic inequalities hold true:
(i) For all θ ∈ T0 and i ∈ J , we have:
limn→∞ Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, θ, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N ) =
Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, θ, T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N )−E[(Q
i
θ −X
i
θ) 1
⋂
n≥0
{θ = R∗i < θNn+i}
].
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(ii)
limn→∞
(
Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, τNn+N+i, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N )+
E[(Y iτNn+N+i −Q
i
τNn+N+i
) 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i<T}]
)
=
Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) +E[(Y
i
T ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}]+
limn→∞E[(X
i
T ∗
i
− Y iT ∗
i
) 1 {τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i, T ∗i =R
∗
i
<T}].
Proof: (i) Actually
Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, θ, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N )
= E[Xiθ1 {θ≤θNn+N+i} + Y
i
θNn+N+i
1 {θ>θNn+N+i} + (Q
i
θ −X
i
θ)1 {θ=θNn+N+i}].
(4.5)
As the process Y i is RCLL and of class [D] and the sequence (θNn+N+i)n is decreasing then,
when n→∞,
E[Xiθ1 {θ≤θNn+N+i} + Y
i
θNn+N+i
1 {θ>θNn+N+i}]→ E[X
i
θ1 {θ≤R∗i } + Y
i
R∗
i
1 {θ>R∗
i
}]. (4.6)
On the other hand, when n→∞,
E[(Qiθ −X
i
θ)1 {θ=θNn+N+i}]→ E[(Q
i
θ −X
i
θ)1 {θ=R∗i }]−E[(Q
i
θ −X
i
θ) 1
⋂
n≥0
(θ = R∗i < θNn+i)
].
(4.7)
Actually (4.7) is obtained in paying attention whether the sequence (θNn+N+i)n is of sta-
tionary type or not. Going back now to (4.5), take the limit and make use of (4.6) and (4.7)
to obtain the desired result . ✷
11
Next let us focus on (ii). Let i ∈ J be fixed, then:
limn→∞
(
Ji(τNn+N+1, τNn+N+2, · · · , τNn+N+i−1, τNn+N+i, τNn+i+1, · · · , τNn+N )+
E[(Y iτNn+N+i −Q
i
τNn+N+i
) 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i<T}]
)
= limn→∞E[X
i
τNn+N+i
1 {τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i} + Y
i
θNn+N+i
1 {τNn+N+i>θNn+N+i}+
Y iθNn+N+i 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i<T} +Q
i
T 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i=T}]
= limn→∞E[X
i
τNn+N+i
1{τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i; T ∗i ≤R
∗
i
} + Y
i
θNn+N+i
1 {τNn+N+i>θNn+N+i; T ∗i ≥R
∗
i
}
+Y iθNn+N+i 1 {τNn+N+i=θNn+N+i; T ∗i =R
∗
i
<T} +Q
i
T 1{T ∗i =R
∗
i
=T}]
= E[XiT ∗
i
1 {T ∗
i
<R∗
i
} +Q
i
T ∗
i
1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
} + Y
i
R∗
i
1{T ∗
i
>R∗
i
}]−E[Q
i
T ∗
i
1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}]+
limn→∞E[X
i
T ∗
i
1 {τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i; T ∗i =R
∗
i
} + Y
i
R∗
i
1 {τNn+N+i≥θNn+N+i; T ∗i =R
∗
i
<T}]
= Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) + E[(Y
i
T ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1{T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}]+
limn→∞E[(X
i
T ∗
i
− Y iT ∗
i
) 1 {τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i, T ∗i =R
∗
i
<T}]
which is the desired result. Note that in the fourth inequality we have taken into account
the fact that the processes Xi and Y i are of RCLL and of class [D].
An obvious consequence of Lemmata 4.1 and 4.2 is:
Corollary 4.1 For all θ ∈ T0 and all i ∈ J
Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, θ, T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N )−E[(Q
i
θ −X
i
θ) 1
⋂
n≥0
{θ = R∗i < θNn+i}
]
≤ Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) +E[(Y
i
T ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}]
+ limn→∞E[(X
i
T ∗
i
− Y iT ∗
i
) 1 {τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i, T ∗i =R
∗
i
<T}].
(4.8)
Lemma 4.3 (i) We have:
lim
n→∞
E[(XiT ∗
i
− Y iT ∗
i
) 1 {τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i, T ∗i =R
∗
i
<T}] = 0
and then for all ε > 0
lim
n→∞
P [Y iT ∗
i
−XiT ∗
i
> ε, τNn+N+i < θNn+N+i, T
∗
i = R
∗
i < T ] = 0.
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(ii) For all θ ∈ T0 and all i ∈ J ,
Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, θ, T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) + E[(Y
i
R∗
i
−QiR∗
i
) 1 {θ=R∗
i
<T}]
≤ Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) +E[(Y
i
R∗
i
−QiR∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}].
Proof: (i) Actually let θ be the following F-stopping time:
θ = T ∗i 1 {T ∗i <R
∗
i
} + T 1{T ∗
i
≥R∗
i
}.
Then using inequality (4.8) yields:
Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, θ, T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N )−E[(Q
i
θ −X
i
θ) 1
⋂
n≥0
{θ = R∗i < θNn+i}
]
= Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) + E[(Y
i
T ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}]
≤ Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) +E[(Y
i
T ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}]
+ limn→∞E[(X
i
T ∗
i
− Y iT ∗
i
) 1 {τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i, T ∗i =R
∗
i
<T}].
Hence
lim
n→∞
E[(XiT ∗
i
− Y iT ∗
i
) 1 {τNn+N+i<θNn+N+i, T ∗i =R
∗
i
<T}] ≥ 0
which completes the proof since XiT ∗
i
− Y iT ∗
i
≤ 0 thanks to Assumption (A3).
(ii) Let θ˜ be the following F-stopping time:
θ˜ = θ 1 {θ=R∗
i
<T )c + T 1 {θ=R∗
i
<T}
where the superscript (c) stands for the complement. Since P [θ˜ = R∗i < T ] = 0 we obtain
from (4.8) and (i),
Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, θ˜, T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N )−E[(Q
i
θ˜
−Xi
θ˜
) 1 ⋂
n≥0
{θ˜ = R∗i < θNn+i}
]
= Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, θ, T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) + E[(Y
i
R∗
i
−QiR∗
i
) 1 {θ=R∗
i
<T}]
≤ Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i , T
∗
i+1, · · · , T
∗
N ) + E[(Y
i
R∗
i
−QiR∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}],
whence the desired result.
We now give a key-result which allows us to conclude.
Proposition 4.1 Under Assumption (A4), for all i ∈ J we have:
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}] = 0. (4.9)
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Proof: First note that for any i ∈ J we have:
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
)1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}] ≤∑
I={i1,...,ik}⊂J , i∈I and k≥2
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
)1 {T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=...=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
}},
where R∗I = min{T
∗
j ; j /∈ I} with min ∅ = T . Therefore it is enough to show that for any
i1, ..., ik ∈ J , which we assume w.l.o.g satisfying i1 < i2 < · · · < ik, we have:
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
)1 {T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
}] = 0
for any i ∈ I = {i1, · · · , ik}.
Step 1: For any n ≥ 0,
P [An :=
k⋂
j=1
{R∗I > τNn+ij ≥ θNn+ij}] = 0. (4.10)
Actually, first note that P [A0] = P [A1] = 0. Next let us show that An ⊂ An−1 for any
n ≥ 2.
On An:
By the definitions of τn and R
∗
I , we have: ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, ∀α /∈ I,
τNn+ij = τN(n−1)+ij and τNn+ij < R
∗
I ≤ τNn+α ≤ τN(n−ℓ)+α, ℓ ≥ 0. (4.11)
Therefore in using those properties we deduce that:
θNn+ij := τNn+ij−1 ∧ τNn+ij−2 ∧ · · · ∧ τNn+ij−N+1
= τNn+ij−1 ∧ τNn+ij−2 ∧ · · · ∧ τNn+i1 ∧ τNn+ik−N ∧ τNn+ik−1−N ∧ · · · ∧ τNn+ij+1−N
(4.12)
Let us give briefly the justification of the second equality. Indeed for some ℓ ∈ {1, ..., N −1}
either ij − ℓ > 0 or ij − ℓ ≤ 0. Case (i): ij − ℓ > 0. Then if ij − ℓ ∈ {i1, ..., ij−1} then we
keep it in the expression of θNn+ij and if ij − ℓ /∈ {i1, ..., ij−1} then we know from (4.11)
that, e.g., τNn+ij−ℓ ≥ τNn+ij−1 and then τNn+ij−ℓ is deleted from the expression of θNn+ij .
Case (ii): ij − ℓ ≤ 0. Then τNn+ij−ℓ = τN(n−1)+ij−ℓ+N with ij − ℓ+N ≥ ij +1. Once more
if ij− ℓ+N ∈ {ij+1, ..., ik} then we keep τNn+ij−ℓ it in the expression of θNn+ij . Otherwise,
i.e., if ij − ℓ+N /∈ {ij+1, ..., ik}, then τNn+ij−ℓ = τN(n−1)+ij−ℓ+N ≥ τNn+ij−ℓ+N ≥ τNn+ij−1
and τNn+ij−ℓ is deleted from the expression of θNn+ij . Thus we are done.
Now the first equality of (4.11) yields:
θNn+ij = τNn+ij−1 ∧ τNn+ij−2 ∧ · · · ∧ τNn+i1 ∧ τNn+ik ∧ τNn+ik−1 ∧ · · · ∧ τNn+ij+1 . (4.13)
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Next by a backward induction argument we have that for any j ∈ {1, · · · , k},
τNn+ij = τN(n−1)+ij = τN(n−2)+ij and θNn+ij = θN(n−1)+ij .
Actually for j = k, by (4.11) and (4.13) we have:
τNn+ik = τN(n−1)+ik ≥ θNn+ik = τNn+ik−1 ∧ τNn+ik−2 ∧ · · · ∧ τNn+i1
= τN(n−1)+ik−1 ∧ τN(n−1)+ik−2 ∧ · · · ∧ τN(n−1)+i1
= θN(n−1)+ik .
The last equality holds true since by monotonicity we have θN(n−1)+ik ≥ θNn+ik and by
definition
θN(n−1)+ik ≤ τN(n−1)+ik−1 ∧ τN(n−1)+ik−2 ∧ · · · ∧ τN(n−1)+i1 = θNn+ik .
Therefore by definition of τN(n−1)+ik we have τNn+ik = τN(n−1)+ik = τN(n−2)+ik . Thus the
property is satisfied for j = k.
Assume now that the property is satisfied for j = k, .., ℓ + 1 (2 ≤ ℓ+ 1 ≤ k) and let us
show it is also valid for j = ℓ. From (4.11) and (4.13) we have
τNn+iℓ = τN(n−1)+iℓ ≥ θNn+iℓ
and
θNn+iℓ = τNn+iℓ−1 ∧ τNn+iℓ−2 ∧ · · · ∧ τNn+i1 ∧ τNn+ik ∧ τNn+ik−1 ∧ · · · ∧ τNn+iℓ+1 .
On the other hand
θN(n−1)+iℓ = τN(n−1)+iℓ−1 ∧ τN(n−1)+iℓ−2 ∧ · · · ∧ τN(n−1)+iℓ−N+1
= τNn+iℓ−1 ∧ ... ∧ τNn+i1 ∧ τN(n−1)+ik−N · · · ∧ τN(n−1)+iℓ+1−N .
This second equality is obtained in the same way as in (4.12) in using (4.11) and the
induction hypothesis. Therefore, once more by the induction hypothesis, we have:
θN(n−1)+iℓ = τNn+iℓ−1 ∧ ... ∧ τNn+i1 ∧ τNn+ik · · · ∧ τNn+iℓ+1
= θNn+iℓ.
It follows that
τNn+iℓ = τN(n−1)+iℓ ≥ θNn+iℓ = θN(n−1)+iℓ
and then τN(n−1)+iℓ = τN(n−2)+iℓ . Thus the property is satisfied for ℓ.
Therefore for any j ∈ {1, ..., k} we have
τNn+ij = τN(n−1)+ij ≥ θNn+ij = θN(n−1)+ij
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which implies that An ⊂ An−1, for any n ≥ 1 and then P (An) = 0 for any n ≥ 0 since
P (A0) = 0. ✷
Step 2: To proceed let n ≥ 0 and ε > 0, then we have:
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
}] ≤
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1⋂k
j=1
{T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
; R∗
I
>τNn+ij≥θNn+ij }
] +
k∑
j=1
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
; R∗
I
≤τNn+ij }
] +
k∑
j=1
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1
{Y i
T∗
i
−Qi
T∗
i
≤ 1
ε
; Y
ij
T∗
ij
−X
ij
T∗
ij
>ε; T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
; τNn+ij<θNn+ij }
] +
k∑
j=1
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1
{Y i
T∗
i
−Qi
T∗
i
> 1
ε
; Y
ij
T∗
ij
−X
ij
T∗
ij
>ε; T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
; τNn+ij<θNn+ij }
] +
k∑
j=1
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1
{Y
ij
T∗
ij
−X
ij
T∗
ij
≤ε; T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
; τNn+ij<θNn+ij }
].
Therefore, in taking into account (4.10), we have:
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
}] ≤
k∑
j=1
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
ij
<R∗
I
; R∗
I
≤τNn+ij }
] +
1
ε
k∑
j=1
P (Y
ij
T ∗
ij
−X
ij
T ∗
ij
> ε; T ∗ij = R
∗
ij
< T ; τNn+ij < θNn+ij )+
kE[(Y iT ∗
i
−XiT ∗
i
) 1 {Y i
T∗
i
−Xi
T∗
i
> 1
ε
}] +
∑k
j=1E[(Y
i
T ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1
{Y
ij
T∗
i
−X
ij
T∗
i
≤ε,T ∗
i
<T}
].
Now taking first the limit as n → ∞ and using the second property of Lemma 4.3-(ii)
for the third term of the right-hand side, then taking the limit as ε→ 0 to obtain:
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
}] ≤
k∑
j=1
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1
{Y
ij
ij
−X
ij
T∗
i
=0,T ∗
i
<T}
]
But by Assumption (A4) we have E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1
{Y
ij
ij
−X
ij
T∗
i
=0,T ∗
i
<T}
] = 0 therefore
E[(Y iT ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i1
=T ∗
i2
=···=T ∗
ik
<R∗
I
}] = 0 and E[(Y
i
T ∗
i
−QiT ∗
i
) 1 {T ∗
i
=R∗
i
<T}] = 0
which completes the proof of (4.9).
We are now ready to give the main result of this paper which is a direct consequence of
Lemma 4.3-(ii), Proposition 4.1 and the fact that Y i ≥ Qi for any i ∈ J .
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Theorem 4.2 Under assumptions (A1)-(A4), the N -uplet of stopping times (T ∗i )i=1,...,N
is a Nash equilibrium point for the N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with
(Ji)i∈J .
Remark 4.3 Note that (T ∗i )i∈J and (Ji(T
∗
1 , T
∗
2 , · · · , T
∗
N ))i∈J do not depend on the processes
(Qit)t<T for any i ∈ J . On the other hand the NEP of a Dynkin game is not unique. Actually
assume that for any i ∈ J and t ≤ T , Xit =
1
2 and Q
i
t = Y
i
t = 1. Therefore one can easily
show, directly or in using Proposition 2.1, that for any t0 ∈ [0, T ], (t0, ..., t0) is a NEP for
this game and Ji(t0, ..., t0) = 1, ∀i ∈ J .
Finally we have the following result related to Proposition 2.1 which is a direct conse-
quence of the fact that (T ∗i )i∈J is a NEP for the nonzero-sum Dynkin game and, Proposition
1 and Remark 2.3 and Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.4 For i ∈ J , let us set:
W i := (W it )t≤T := R(X
i
t1 {t<R∗i } + Y˜
i
R∗
i
1 {t≥R∗
i
})
where R is the Snell envelope operator. Then (T ∗i )i∈J and (W
1, ...,WN ) satisfy (i)-(iii) of
Proposition 2.1.
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